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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Markcus Raymond May appeals from the judgment of conviction, arguing that the
district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On May 29, 2010, in Buhl, Idaho, May stopped his car in front of his exgirlfriend's house, identified and approached her new boyfriend, James Lambert,
leveled a gun at his chest, and pulled the trigger. (R., pp.29-30.) The gun misfired, and
Mr. Lambert fled as May loaded another round into the chamber and gave chase. (R.,
pp.31-32.) May fired an additional four shots at Mr. Lambert, one of which struck him in
the leg. (Id.) Mr. Lambert ran into his girlfriend's house to hide, locking the front door
behind him. (R., p.32.) May broke the front door's window, reached in to unlock it, then
followed Mr. Lambert and his girlfriend to the back bedroom where they had barricaded
themselves into the room. (Id.) May gouged the door three times with a pry-bar, and
then fled the scene when his ex-girlfriend told him that she had called the police. (Id.)
Police were dispatched to the scene and began an extended search for May.
(R., p.22.) Following a tip, police located May in Twin Falls and attempted to initiate a
traffic stop, but May refused to pull over. (R., pp.22-23.) The police pursued May in a
high speed car chase that reached 80 mph. (R., p.23.) Police used tire spikes to blow
out May's right front tire in an effort to stop him, but May continued to drive. (Id.) May
was not stopped until officers hit his car, causing him to spin out, and then other officers
collided with the car to prevent May from leaving. (R., pp.23-24.) May still attempted to
pull away, until police shot him in the head, bringing the car chase to an end. (Id.)
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The state charged May with qggravated assault, aggravated battery, burglary,
and felony eluding. (R., pp.101-04.) The state also filed notice of its intent to seek a
weapon enhancement.

(R., pp.102-03.) After extensive negotiations, May entered a

plea agreement with prosecutors pursuant to which May pied guilty to the aggravated
battery and misdemeanor eluding, and the state agreed to dismiss the remaining
charges and recommend a unified sentence of 30 years with ten years fixed.

(R.,

pp.242, 244-47; 1/27/2011 Tr., p.19, L.25 - p.21, L.16 (attached as exhibit)).
More than a month later but prior to sentencing, May, with the assistance of new
counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea with accompanying brief, alleging
that he was placed under undue pressure from his prior attorney to accept
the plea negotiation and enter into the guilty plea notwithstanding the fact
that he did not want to[,] ... that he did not fully understand what he was
doing and the repercussions[, and] ... that he did not have enough time to
speak with his prior attorney about the negotiation and the guilty plea.
(R., pp.264-71.) May also filed an affidavit in support of his motion. (R., pp.280-82.)
The state objected to the motion to withdraw (R., pp.284-89), and the motion was set for
a hearing (R., p.292).
After the hearing, the district court denied May's motion to withdraw, finding that
May's testimony was not credible and that May failed to show a just reason for
withdrawal.

(See Tr., pp.94-114; see also R., pp.303-04.) The district court entered

judgment and imposed the recommended sentence of 30 years with ten years fixed for
aggravated battery with a weapon enhancement. (R., pp.323-28.) May filed a timely
notice of appeal. (R., pp.330-32.)
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ISSUE
May states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. May's
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas?
(Appellant's brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has May failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of
his pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea?
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ARGUMENT
May Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion In Denying His
Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea
A.

Introduction
May asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-11.) Specifically, May contends that his
unsupported testimony that he was coerced by his attorney into pleading guilty and that
he did not comprehend the definition of an "indeterminate sentence" established just
reason for withdrawing his guilty plea.

(Id., pp.10-11.)

The district court, however,

found that May's testimony was not credible, and the record supports the court's
determination that May failed to show any just reason for withdrawal. May has failed to
establish an abuse of the district court's discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to

whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from
arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 775, 780-781
(Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 P.2d 330, 334 (Ct.
App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's factual findings if they are
supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d
1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994).

C.

May Failed To Demonstrate A Just Reason For Withdrawing His Guflty Plea
May filed his motion to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing. (R., p.264.)

"When a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made before sentencing, a defendant need
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only demonstrate 'just reason' for withdrawal of the plea." State v. Stone, 147 Idaho
330, 333, 208 P.3d 734, 737 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing I.C.R. 33(c); State v. Arthur, 145
Idaho 219, 222, 177 P.3d 966, 969 (2008); State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 801, 761
P.2d 1151, 1153 (1998)).

The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating a

justification for withdrawal of his guilty plea. Stone, 147 Idaho at 333, 208 P.3d at 737
(citing State v. Nath, 141 Idaho 584, 586, 114 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005); State v.
Acevedo, 131 Idaho 513, 516, 960 P .2d 196, 199 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Medina, 128
Idaho 19, 25, 909 P.2d 637, 643 (Ct. App. 1996)). May failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating a just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea.
In his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, May claimed:
that he was placed under undue pressure from his prior attorney to accept
the plea negotiation and enter into the guilty plea notwithstanding the fact
that he did not want to[,] ... that he did not fully understand what he was
doing and the repercussions[, and] ... that he did not have enough time to
speak with his prior attorney about the negotiation and the guilty plea.
(R., p.271.)

The district court held a hearing on May's motion where both May and his prior
counsel testified, and the plea agreement, transcript from the change of plea hearing,
and the recording of a phone conversation between May and his mother were entered
into evidence as exhibits.

(See, generally, Tr.)

After the evidentiary phase of the

hearing, the district court engaged in a detailed factual analysis and presented its
findings on the record. (Tr., p.94, L.19 - p.106, L.18.) Those findings are attached to
this brief as "Appendix A."

After enumerating several of the discrepancies and

inconsistencies in May's testimony, the district court found that May was not credible
and instead credited the testimony of his prior counsel. (Tr., p.105, L.22 - p.106, L.18.)
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The district court, therefore, concluded that May failed to carry his burden of proving
facts that would constitute a just reason to withdraw his guilty plea, and properly
exercised its discretion by denying May's motion.
On appeal, May argues that his testimony alone provided a just reason to
withdraw his guilty plea and that the district court's finding that May's testimony was not
credible was clearly erroneous in light of the contemporaneous phone call he made to
his mother. (Appellant's brief, p.10.) May's argument lacks merit. After entering into
the plea agreement, May called his mother that evening to celebrate the deal. She was
not pleased that he had entered any plea agreement without her present, and he had to
explain why it was a positive deal. The district court listened to the recording of that
conversation, and found that May, contrary to his testimony offered during the hearing
that he had been coerced into accepting the bargain, had expressed satisfaction with
his prior counsel's representation.

(Tr., p.106, Ls.4-11.)

The power to assess the

credibility of witnesses is the sole province of the trier of fact, and appellate courts will
not usurp that authority. See State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 525, 81 P.3d 1230, 1235
(2003); State v. Jones, 145 Idaho 639,641, 181 P.3d 1247, 1249 (Ct. App. 2008). The
trier of fact, in this case the district court, after hearing the testimony offered by both
May and his prior counsel, and reviewing the exhibits which included the recording of
the phone call, found May's testimony not credible and credited the testimony of his
prior counsel. (See Appendix A.)
May also argues that the district court abused its discretion by considering
standards applied in federal cases for an identical federal rule when determining that
May failed to establish a just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief,
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p.11.) May is estopped from making this argument as it was May's substitute counsel
that originally asserted that the federal standard was relevant to his case.

(See R.,

pp.270-71.) If the district court erred in considering the federal standard in determining
whether May had established a just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea, that error
was invited. See State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389,402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000).
Even were this Court to conclude application of federal case law was not invited
by May, May's argument that the district court abused its discretion by considering
federal legal standards for withdrawal of a guilty plea still fails.

The district court

recognized that denying May's motion was within its discretion, acted within the bounds
of that discretion, and exercised reason in denying May's motion. (See Tr., p.106, L.21
- p.114, L.12.) As part of that exercise of discretion, the district court considered a six
factor analysis adopted by a federal court in United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245 (4th
Cir. 1991), for guidance in making its determination.

(Tr., p.108, L.15 - p.109, L.7;

p.111, L.14 - p.113, L.18.) The six factors adopted in Moore were:
(1) whether the defendant has offered credible evidence that his plea was
not knowing or not voluntary, (2) whether the defendant has credibly
asserted his legal innocence, (3) whether there has been a delay between
the entering of the plea and the filing of the motion, (4) whether defendant
has had close assistance of competent counsel, (5) whether withdrawal
will cause prejudice to the government, and (6) whether it will
inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources.
Moore, 931 F.2d at 248 (citing United State v. Hurtado, 846 F.2d 995, 997 (5th Cir.
1988); United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Kobrosky, 711 F.2d 449, 455-56 (1st Cir. 1983)). May has failed to show that anything
in the Moore standard conflicts with Idaho case law. The district court, therefore, cannot
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be said to have abused its discretion by considering relevant factors when reaching its
reasoned determination.
May failed to meet his burden of showing any just reason to withdraw his guilty
plea. The district court, therefore, properly exercised its discretion by denying May's
motion to withdraw his plea. May has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's
discretion. The judgment of the district court should therefore be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's denial of
May's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

DATED this 27th day of February, 2012.

Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 27th day of February, 2012, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SPENCERJ.HAHN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

Deputy Attorney General
RJS/pm
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APPENDIX A

State of Idaho v. Markcus Raymond May
Docket No. 38835-2011
Transcript on Appeal
1 simply a statement by the state which is told to
1 defendant and ask that the court deny his
2
the defendant; and, therefore, Mr. Andersen
2 motion.
3
didn't coerce him.
3
THE COURT: Thank you. Counsel, do
4
Throughout the Rule 11 colloquy as well
4 either of you have Exhibit 1?
5
as answering the questions in the guilty plea
5
MS. STURGILL: It's right there.
6
advisory form, he was asked over and over and
6
THE COURT: Would you mind providing that
7
over again if he was satisfied with
7 to the court.
8
Mr. Andersen's representation; and he Indicated
8
Mr. Williams, your rebuttal, sir.
9
he did. And then during talking to the judge,
9
MR. WILLIAMS: That doesn't bring up
10
he said he was not forced, he was not
10 anything further.
11
threatened, and he did not feel like he was
11
THE COURT: What I would like to do,
12
making this decision under any kind of coercion.
12 folks, Is take a few minutes to digest what I
13
In fact, on the stand this defendant has told
13 have heard today as well as yesterday, put my
14 this court the reason he wanted to plead guilty
14 thoughts together, and then Issue my ruling.
15 is he wanted to take advantage of the plea
15 Let's say I'll do that at 3: 15. I also have one
16
agreement, which Is, the state will ask for 10,
16 other case to take care of In that interim as
17 but you can argue for less. And so he wanted to
17 well. So we will be in recess in this case
18 take that plea, he wanted to enter that plea;
18 untll 3: 15 when I issue my ruling. Okay?
19 and It wasn't for almost two and a half weeks
19
Thank you.
20 that he finally determined that he did not want
20
(2:26 p.m. - Recess.)
21
to take that plea and that he didn't understand
21
22 that he could serve 30 years, even though he
22
23 told the judge he did.
23
24
We would ask the court to find that this
24
25 plea was voluntary and knowingly entered by this
25

92
1

(3:16 p.m.

Reconvene.)

2
3
4
5

6

7
B
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT: Thank you. Be seated,
please. We are back on record at 3: 16 on the
digital clock in the courtroom, again on
CR 2010-6208. Mr. Williams, Mr. May, and
Ms. Sturgill are present.
Counsel, did anything come up In this
recess that you wish to point out or make note
of prior to my ruling?
MR. WILLIAMS: No, Your Honor.
MS. STURGILL: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Very well. The court then,
based on what I have heard today, yesterday and
today, considering the motion and affidavit
before me, I will enter the following ruling and
findings of fact in this case and conclusions of
law:
First of all, as to the findings of fact
that I make, on January 27, 2011, the defendant
entered pleas of guilty to two charges:
aggravated battery with an enhancement for the
use of a deadly weapon and misdemeanor alluding.
On the day of his change of plea, the
defendant had met three times with his counsel,
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Virginia M. Bailey, RPR, CSR No. 262
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1
2
3
4
5

6

7
8
9
10

11
12
13

14
15
16

17
18
19

20
21
22

23
24
25

Benjamin Andersen, that day alone. During the
final visit, Andersen provided a plea agreement
which Is -- and has been admitted as Exhibit 1.
During the day on the 27th, the defendant also
completed a written guilty plea questionnaire,
by lnitlalling each of ten pages and signing the
last two.
During this court's colloquy with
Mr. May, he affirmatively represented to the
court the following: He understood the purpose
for the court's asking him questions under oath.
He has a high school diploma and some college
education at CSI. He understands the nature of
an aggravated battery charge and what it takes
r
to commit the crime and the maximum penaltles.. . . j
He was not laboring under any mental or
psychological problems at the time of the change
[
of plea hearing. Nothing was going on In his
llfe that would affect his ability to make a
reasoned and informed decision. He understood
[
that, by pleading guilty, he gave up all
defenses he might have to the charges. There is
nothing he wanted Mr. Andersen to do to help
[
with his case that Mr. Andersen had not already
done. He was satisfied with Mr. Andersen's

95

I

, State of Idaho v. Markcus Raymond May
Transcript on Appeal
Docket No. 38835-2011
1 representation. He went over discovery with
1 county jail term for the eluding charge. Do you
2 Mr. Andersen and requested no additional
2 understand, based on your plea, that the court
i 3 discovery. I\Jo one forced him or threatened him
3 isn't bound to follow that recommendation?"
/ 4 In any way to plead guilty. He initialed each
4
Answer given: ''Yes, sir."
5 page of the guilty plea advisory form and signed
5
"That your sentence could be up to
6 the last two pages, as already noted. He also
6 30 years in prison, with a unified fixed time
, 7 did not feel that he was under any coercion from
7 exceedin,g the 10 years, up to 30 years fixed
s any source whatsoever in pleading guilty. The
8 without the eligibility for parole?"
9 responses in the written guilty plea
9
Answer: "Yes, sir."
!
10 questionnaire are the same answers he would have 10
That's the end of the quote.
11 given the court if the court asked him any of
11
The defendant gave a factual basis for
l 12 those questions while he was under oath on that
12 the crime, admitting guilt for the charge of
i
13 date.
13 aggravated battery.
14
The court explained that the defendant
14
I quote again from the transcript from
[ 15 waived the right to appeal, quote, if I follow
15 his own words: "I fired a firearm, and James
16 the state's recommendation of a 10-year fixed or
16 Lambert got hit in the leg."
17 do something less than that, end of quote, and
17
The court then questioned: "And the
I 18 the defendant indicated that he understood. The 18 bullet actually struck him in the leg?"
19
Answer: "I believe so."
19 court had the following colloquy with the
20
The defendant further admitted during
20 defendant, which I quote from the transcript:
I 21
21 that colloquy to using a pistol to shoot
"Let's talk then briefly about the plea
22 Mr. Lambert. He gave a further factual basis
22 agreement. It recommends, or the state will
·,
23 for the misdemeanor alluding, admitting driving
23 recommend, a sentence of 30 years, with 10 years
j 24 fixed, 20 years indeterminate, to be served in
24 a car, hearing lights and sirens, and that he
25 didn't pull over.
25 the penitentiary, with a concurrent 6-month

I

I

7

I

I!
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The questionnaire establishes the
following, based upon responses given personally
3 by the defendant, and I'm quoting or referencing
l 4 primarily here, not the questionnaire but the
5 colloquy from Mr. May:
6
The defendant understood the questions
7 asked of him in the form. The defendant asked
8 Mr. Andersen to resolve any questions that he
l
j 9 had. The form includes, "30Y, lSK," as the
10 penalty for the aggravated battery. The court
11
inquired whether this meant 30 years, and the
I 12 defendant agreed. The defendant Indicated that
13 he did not have any motions that he wanted
14
filed. The court asked about this specifically,
!
15 and the defendant indicated he had no motions to
16 file. The defendant indicated he had no
17
witnesses available who would show his
I
I 18
innocence. The defendant had adequate time to
I
19 fill out the form. The defendant had adequate
I 20 access to his attorney for Andersen's assistance
j 21 in completing the form. Mr. Andersen adequately
22 investigated his case, and there were no
I 23 additional items needed before entering a guilty
i
24 plea. There were no motions to be filed in the
25 case. The defendant read the plea agreement.
.98
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l

i
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1

1

2

2
3

4
5
6

7
8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21

22

23
24
25

The defendant understood the plea agreement and
indicated there was nothing about It he didn't
understand. The plea agreement was acceptable
to the defendant, and no one had told him what
his sentence would be. The defendant reserved
the right to appeal but only if the court
exceeded the fixed time recommended by the
state. The defendant needed no additional time
before entering a plea of guilty. The defendant
understood that no one, including his attorney,
could make him piead guilty.
In bold and underlined font, the
defendant answered "yes" to the following
question, Number 88, "Do you understand that, if
the court accepts your gullty pleas, that you
may not be able to withdraw your pleas at a
later date?"
The defendant further acknowledged, "I
have answered the questions on pages 1 through
10 of this guilty plea advisory form truthfully,
understand all of the questions and answers
herein, have discussed each question and answer
with my attomey, and have completed this form
freely and voluntarily," the following then in
all caps again, "with a complete understanding
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State of Idaho v. Markcus Raymond May
Transcript on Appeal
Docket No. 38835-2011
1
of the charges to which I am pleading guilty and
1
The court continues to maintain those
2
with knowledge of the potential consequences of
2 findings today. Nothing In this record
3
this plea." That's the end of all caps.
3 establishes that the plea entered by the
4
"Furthermore, no one has forced me or threatened
4 defendant was anything but knowing, voluntarily,
5
me to plead guilty."
5 and intelligently given. The defendant has a
6
Upon the defendant's return to jail then,
6 college education. His testimony about not
7
alter pleading guilty, he testified that he had
7 understanding legal terms or not understanding
8
discussions with Inmates who were critical of
8 the nature of the agreement is simply
9
his accepting the plea offer. The defendant
9 unsupportable, and this court does not accept
10
claims that he only then understood that the
10 his testimony In this regard.
11
term 10 years fixed meant what it said. The
11
The defendant seeks to withdraw his plea
12
court rejects this testimony from yesterday's
12 based upon alleged coercion by his attorney,
13 hearing. The court concludes that the defendant
13 Benjamin Andersen. This court has several
14
knew very well what he was doing when he pied
14 years' experience with Mr. Andersen In this
15
guilty and when his plea was accepted.
15 courtroom. The court heard from him today,
16
The.record establishes and this court
16 indicating he's been a public defender In this
17
already found that the defendant entered his
17 county for over seven years. He, Mr. Andersen,
18 plea with knowledge of the nature of the charges
18 was appointed on June 2nd, 2010.
19
to which he pied guilty, with an understanding
19
The court accepts his testimony as
20
of the potential penalties, and his plea was
20 follows: He met with Mr. May approximately
21
entered knowingly and voluntarily, that he
21 30 times. His relationship with Mr. May was off
22
committed the crimes to which he pied guilty.
22 and on. It was discussed with this court on one
23
During the plea colloquy, the defendant was
23 occasion, wherein Andersen was retained as
24 asked whether he agreed with those findings, and
24 counsel after this court's hearing. This court
25
he indicated that he agreed.
25 also Inquired specifically in that regard at the

100
change of plea, when Mr. May entered his guilty
2
plea, and received an assurance from
3 Mr. Andersen at least that the relationship was
4
workable.
5
Andersen discussed several different
6
scenarios during his testimony today that the
7
defendant and Andersen had discussed throughout
8 his representation regarding potential sentences
9 and negotiations. The use of fixed and
10 indeterminate time was used extensively In those
11 conversations, and the defendant never indicated
12 that he didn't understand the meaning of those
13 terms during multiple meetings he had with
14 Andersen.
15
Mr. Andersen indicated that he was trying
16 to get Mr. May to accept a 10-year fixed
17 recommendation. Mr. May had come up to 8 years
18 and eventually said he was willing to do 8
19 · fixed, or 8 on the bottom, to quote
20 Mr. Andersen, and that he didn't care about the
21 top. The court concludes from this testimony
22 that May clearly understood the difference
23 between bottom and top, fixed and Indeterminate
24 time. They spoke about indeterminate, according
25 to Mr. Andersen, 50 to a hundred times.
1
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1
2
3

4
5
6

7
8
9
10

11
12
13
14
·15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23

24
25

Everything he did seemed to know, that is,
Mr. May, that he knew what indeterminate meant.
He was concerned about making parole if
he got into fights and so forth. Andersen and
Mr. May spoke about the sentencing numbers for a
significant amount of time, although a specific
hour or day number was not given. The
discussion regarding Exhibit 1, the specific
plea offer, was only 15 minutes. Overall,
Mr. May and Andersen spent hours and hours going
over fixed, indeterminate, parole issues, and
matters that could make parole difficult,
Including fighting with Bubba.
On January 27th, Andersen went through
- I
the offer and guilty plea questionnaire with the
defendant for approximately 20 minutes. Mr. May
filled out the form. Andersen did not.
Andersen never conveyed a likely 65-year
sentence. He did indicate that Mr. May could
not be sentenced for multiple enhancements If
the court determined that the conduct was one
course of continuous events.
Mr. Andersen testified that he never
described himself and the prosecution as we,
quote, unquote, Andersen never said that lf May
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didn't enter a plea, he would make sure May
would get 65 years. Mr. May was a very hands-on
client, looking Into case law and that type of
thing. Mr. May seemed to understand the system
in some ways better than Mr. Andersen did.
After the guilty plea, Mr. Andersen spoke
with Mr. May on February 2nd, 2011, going over
the PSI paperwork. Nothing was discussed about
withdrawing the plea at that time. They met
again on the 9th of February to finish the
paperwork, and nothing was mentioned about a
plea withdrawal then, either. Andersen
mentioned having heard from Mr. May's mother at
some point in that time frame; and Mr. May was
dismissive about his mother's comments and told
Andersen to ignore her. This type of attitude
or conduct is certainly consistent with the way
Mr. May spoke to his mother on the telephone.
The first time May spoke about
withdrawing his guilty plea was after the 16th
of February when he refused to see Andersen.
Mr. Andersen did receive a kite on
February 13th; and Mr. May indicated that, after
thinking about it, he wanted to withdraw his
plea, because he was threatened in entering his
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the witness stand and the motivation he has to
now testify otherwise than he did previousiy
under oath.
The court also notes the discussion
Mr. May had with his mother on the telephone the
evening he entered the plea. He speaks of
Andersen's help In terms of a tone that leads
this court to believe that the defendant was
then satisfied with Andersen's representation
and that the agreement, the 10 fixed and 20
indeterminate, was acceptabie.
The court, therefore, concludes that
Mr. May's testimony at the time of the change of
plea hearing on January 27th was accurate, given
under oath, and is relied upon by this court.
The testimony given yesterday and today seems
more the product of second-guessing, wishful
thinking, and/or dishonesty.
I, therefore, conclude, as matters of
law, the motion to withdraw a guilty plea is
governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c). Under
that rule, the withdrawal of a guilty plea may
be allowed in the trial court's discretion. The
Court of Appeals of Idaho has further
established that such discretion should be

plea and referenced some Indication that he was
innocent.
Andersen then met with Mr. May on the
23rd of February, when Mr. May agreed to see
him, Mr. May told Andersen he wanted to
withdraw his plea and told Andersen on that
occasion for the first time that he did not
understand what "indeterminate time" meant.
Andersen told Mr. May that It would be a mistake
to file the motion and to think on it and
Mr. Andersen would come see him later.
Andersen saw Mr. May again on March 2nd.
He went with Robin Weeks, another public
defender, to see Mr. May, because Robin Weeks
seems to calm people down. It didn't work.
Mr. May thought they were just stringing him
along and not filing what he wanted filed. He
was accusing Mr. Andersen by then of tricking
him Into pleading guilty; and shortly
thereafter, the case was conflicted to
Mr. Williams who represents Mr. May here today.
Based upon the entirety of these facts,
as a factual conclusion, the court thus rejects
Mr. May's testimony In this courtroom as lacking
support In the record based upon his demeanor on
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liberally applied.
In determining a matter within the
court's discretion, I must first make a
determination that the issue is one involving
the exercise of discretion. I must act within
the outer boundaries of that discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable
to. the choices available to the court. And
finally, the court must reach its decision by an
exercise of reason. To act within this court's
discretion, I must give due consideration to the
facts and circumstances of the case and
correctly apply the law thereto.
As applied In the context of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea, a district court should
Identify conflicting factors bearing on the
issues and reach a decision based on a
well-reasoned consideration of those factors.
The scope of this court's discretion Is
thus affected by several things. One of those
is the timing of the motion. Where a motion is
filed before sentencing, as Mr. May's motion
here is, the defendant need only show a just
reason for withdrawing his plea. The court is
also allowed to temper its liberallty In these

_____________________ ____________________
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